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Abstract: 
After World War II and up until the  1980’s, the  liberalization of trade was 
realized on a multilateral basis. World trade grew at twice the pace of GDP 
growth  (Krueger,  1999).  However,  starting  in  the  mid  1980’s,  preferential 
trading  arrangements  (PTAs)  increased  in  numbers.  Perhaps  the  most 
influential  PTA  ever to be signed could be  the North America Free Trade 
Agreement, or simply NAFTA, which came into effect January 1, 1994. The 
agreement established a free-trade area between its member countries- US, 
Canada and Mexico- in which all tariffs would be phased out between them, 
but each country would  maintain its separate national barriers against the 
rest of the world. A lot of attention has been paid to the impact of NAFTA on 
the welfare of its member countries and on the rest of the world. This paper 
will focus on the impact of the agreement on the US’s beer trade flows by 
analyzing  annual  import  and  export  data  using  several  methods.  To  our 
knowledge  there  is  no  precedent  for  such  research.  Section  II  provides  a 
brief review of the conclusions and methodology of existing works on NAFTA 
trade issues, as well as some important aspects of the agreement. Section III 
provides an overview of the world beer industry, and the NAFTA member 
countries beer markets. Section IV provides in great detail the methodology 
that we will employ. The focus of Section V is to explain the results obtained. 
Section VI provides conclusions and implications for further research on this 
subject. References and other sources can be found in Section VII. 
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     NAFTA and review of literature 
      NAFTA  was  brought  forward  for 
consideration in the US congress in the 
fall of 1993. At the time the agreement 
sought  to  remove  the  trade  barriers 
between its members and create a huge 
new  market  with  a  combined  GDP  of 
around  $7.9  trillion  and  population  of 
380  million  people.  The  agreement 
came into effect on January 1, 1994. It 
superseded the Canada US Free Trade 
Agreement,  or  CUSFTA,  which  had 
been  in  existence  since  1989.  The 
agreement did not call for the immediate 
removal  of  all  tariff  and  import  duties, 
but a gradual phase out with an average 
duration between ten to fifteen years. It 
did  immediately  remove  a  substantial 
amount of quantitative barriers to trade, 
and  implemented  even  more  favorable 
North American rules of origin clauses. 
Today  NAFTA  has  become  a  huge 
economic arena with a combined GDP 
of around $11.8 trillion and 420 million 
people. 
NAFTA  has  been  criticized  (or 
acclaimed) by a wide variety of groups 
and for a number of reasons. This has 
given  rise  to  a  plethora  of  academic 
literature. Its impact has been intensely 
scrutinized  on  a  broad  number  of 
subjects. We will briefly discuss some of 
the  literature  that  focuses  on  the 
agreement’s  impact  on  trade; 
particularly  on  the  issues  of  trade 
diversion/creation.  Although  the  scope   40 
of this paper is not directly tied to these 
issues, the methodology applied is very 
similar  to  the  one  that  we  have 
employed. The comments on the results 
will  be  limited  to  the  changes  in  the 
bilateral  trade  between  the  US  and  its 
member partners. No great detail will be 
placed  upon  the  impact  of  NAFTA  on 
Canada – Mexico trade, or on whether 
the  agreement  was  trade  diverting  of 
trade creating as a whole. 
Before  Gould  (1998),  all  of  the 
literature  about  NAFTA’s  impact  on 
trade  was  forward  looking.  The  work 
was  done  either  before  its 
implementation  or  shortly  thereafter. 
Gould  uses  a  gravity-model 
methodology  to  asses  the  impact  of 
NAFTA  on  bilateral  trade  flows.  He 
attempts  to  isolate  the  impact  of  the 
agreement  by  accounting  for  the 
“fundamental  determinants  of  trade 
flows”. The data employed was bilateral 
aggregate  trade  data  on  a  quarterly 
basis,  for  1980  through  1996.  He 
arrived  to  the  conclusion  that  after  its 
first three years NAFTA may have had 
an impact on US aggregate exports to 
Mexico,  but  that  it  had  no  effect  on 
Mexican  exports  to  the  US  or  on  US 
bilateral trade with Canada. 
Krueger (1999) uses trade data at 
the  one  and  two  digit  SITC  level 
commodity  categories.  She  employs 
three  different  methodologies  to 
address  the  issue  of  trade 
diversion/creation;  decreasing  absolute 
trade  with  the  rest  of  the  world,  “shift 
and  share”  analysis,  and  gravity 
equations. She found that intra-NAFTA 
trade intensified during the 1990’s, and 
that  a  shift  share  analysis  shows  an 
increase in Mexico’s share of exports to 
the US. Her gravity equations approach 
found  no  evidence  that  trade  patterns 
were  significantly  altered  by  PTAs, 
although  she  did  find  that  NAFTA 
countries  imported  less  than  predicted 
from  members  outside  of  the 
agreement. 
Fukao,  Okubo  and  Stern  (2002), 
use  a  partial  equilibrium  model  of 
differentiated  product  industries  for 
different  countries.  They  use  a  panel 
analysis of US import data for the period 
1992-98 at the HS 2 digit level, and a 
higher disaggregate level of HS 4 digit. 
Their  findings  include  that  tariff  rates 
were significant in 15 cases out of the 
70  regressions  that  they  ran.  They 
primarily  conclude  that  the  increase  in 
Mexican imports to the US came at the 
expense  of  lower  cost  providers 
primarily from East Asia. They highlight 
the  importance  of  disaggregating 
commodities in analyzing the effects of 
NAFTA,  and  the  need  to  study  the 
impact  of  the  interaction  of  FDI  and 
outsourcing with tariff rates. 
All of the literature seems to point 
out  that  the  effect  of  NAFTA  on  trade 
flows  seems  to  be  underscored  by 
certain  exogenous  events.  These 
events make the creation of a proxy for 
a  controlled  experiment  difficult. 
Krueger  (1999)  provides  great  insight 
into  these  events  and  their  possible 
effects.  (1)  The  signing  of  the  Bush-
Salinas  agreement  in  June  1990.  This 
led to the belief that such negotiations 
would ultimately result in the addition of 
Mexico  into  the  free-trade  area
1.  
Therefore one cannot assume that the 
data before 1990 provides an accurate 
scenario of trade without NAFTA. Many 
economic  decisions  could  have  been 
taken  into  consideration  prior  to  the 
agreement’s  signing,  such  as  possible 
FDI  opportunities.  (2)  The  gradual 
phase out of tariffs during a ten-fifteen 
year  period.  Therefore  one  must  take 
into account that trade flows after 1994 
where  not  entirely  free  of  imposed 
duties.  (3)  Trade  liberalization,  under 
the WTO and PTAs, in the world as a 
whole.  Liberalization  of  trade  must  be 
taken into account as its effect on world 
trade  patterns  cannot  be  easily 
discerned.  (4)  Mexico’s  trade 
liberalization  in  the  mid  1980’s.  The 
country had  virtually removed  all of its 
quantitative  restrictions  to  imports,  as 
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well  as  reduced  its  high  average  tariff 
rate by 1990. This led to a higher level 
of Mexican trade in the early 90’s and 
could remove some importance on the 
effect  of  NAFTA  on  Mexican  trade 
flows.  (5)  The  real  appreciation  of  the 
Mexican  peso  during  1987-1994  and 
the following depreciation as a result of 
the  1994  financial  crisis.  In  1987  the 
peso adopted a nominal anchor. Under 
this  exchange  rate  regime,  the  peso 
was  allowed  to  depreciate  in  a 
proportion  less  than  the  inflation 
differential between the US and Mexico. 
This led to a cumulative appreciation of 
the peso, which in turn was reflected in 
sharp  changes  in  the  percentage  of 
Mexican trade. Exports as a percentage 
of  GDP  fell  from  19.7%  in  1987  to 
12.7%  in  1992.  Imports  rose  from 
13.4% of GDP in 1987 to 18.8% of GDP 
in  1994
2.  After  the  political  turmoil  in 
1994  the  currency  depreciated  by  a 
factor  of  around  100%.  These  violent 
swings  in  the  peso  might  underscore 
some  of  the  impact  that NAFTA might 
have  had  on  Mexican  trade  patterns 
with  the  US.  (6)  The  creation  of 
CUSFTA. The fact that Canada and the 
US already had a free-trade area prior 
to  1994,  might  bias  the  impact  of 
NAFTA on US-Canadian trade.  
 
The Beer Industry 
World  beer  consumption  reached 
an  estimated  133  million  kiloliters, 
around 35 billion gallons, in 1999
3. The 
world  beer  industry  is  relatively 
fragmented  compared  to  other 
beverage  industries.  In  1998  the  top 
four players accounted for only 22% of 
global volume, compared to 78% in soft 
drinks  and  44%  in  spirits
4.  The  world 
beer  market  can  be  broken  down  into 
six major regional markets with different 
sizes and growth rates (See Figure 1).  
Within these regional markets there are 
                                                 
2 Source: IMF, International Statistics Yearbook, 
1998. 
3 Source; Japan Brewers organization. 
4 Ivey(2000). 
also  major  differences  in  consumption 
per capita in each of the countries (See 
Figure 2). 
World  beer  trade  is  a  relatively 
small  fraction  of  the  global  beer 
industry. Although the beer industry has 
huge  economies  of  scale  and  there  is 
some convergence in local tastes due to 
the  global  media,  there  seem  to  be 
many factors that inhibit the exportation 
of beer. These factors are not related to 
any  quantitative  restrictions  to  trade 
imposed  by  the  government  such  as 
tariffs  or  quotas.  We  will  group  these 
factors into a category called “non tariff 
barriers  to  trade”.  Varying  local  tastes 
and  preferences,  and  the  profound 
concentration  of  the  industry  in  some 
countries  are  the  two  main  non  tariff 
barriers. The former has to do with the 
immense political clout that some beer 
companies have in their home markets. 
In some countries, as it is the case in 
Mexico,  the  beer  industry  is  an 
oligopoly.  The  significant  importance 
that  these  companies  have  in  their 
home economies gives them the ability 
to  influence  their  government’s 
protectionist  policies.  This  powerful 
influence- and the laxer legal systems- 
also allow beer companies to engage in 
competitive  practices  that  would  be 
illegal in the US. For example as a food 
manager at Mexico City’s Tony Roma’s 
restaurant  says;  “We  used  to  carry  28 
different  kinds  of  beer,  including 
American  beers.  But  Modelo  -  the 
makers  of  Corona-  gave  us  money  to 
sell only its beers
5.”  Varying tastes and 
preferences are a common determining 
factor in the trade of consumer goods. 
Heavy and rich ales, as it is the case of 
Samuel  Adams,  would  not  have  much 
demand in hotter tropical climates. Yet, 
as opposed to the case of soft drinks, 
most  beer  drinkers  in  many  countries 
also seem to exhibit a strong preference 
for  drinking  their  own  national  brand.  
This sense of “national pride” can pose 
a  huge  non  tariff  trade  barrier  as 
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consumers obtain a higher utility when 
consuming  their  own  national  beer 
brand.  For  example  as  a  bartender  in 
Mexico  City’s  Outback  says;  “The 
Americans beat us at everything, even 
soccer.  The  one  thing  we  do  better  is 
beer
6.”  These non tariff trade  barriers 
coupled  with  the  strict  protectionist 
policies that some countries impose on 
beer imports have resulted in a glut of 
“global beer brands”. 
Due  to  the  difficulties  involved  in 
exporting beer and the stagnation of the 
larger mature beer markets, the world’s 
biggest  brewers  have  been  forced  to 
consolidate over the past two decades 
in order to achieve growth. Some of the 
world’s  major  beer  companies  have 
bought  existing  brewers  in  other 
markets and now hold a huge portfolio 
of  brands  in  many  different  countries 
(See  Figure  3).  During  the  past  two 
decades there has been an increasing 
demand  for  the  super  premium,  and 
premium  beer  brands  in  many  of  the 
developed  countries  as  consumers 
have become more sophisticated. This 
is  especially  the  case  in  the  US  and 
Japan. 
NAFTA  has  given  its  members 
access  to  a  beer  market  worth  an 
estimated $76.36 billion dollars in 2002. 
The North American beer market is the 
third largest regional beer market in the 
world  after  Western  Europe  with  an 
estimated  value  of  $107.8  billion  in 
1999, and the Asian-Pacific region with 
an  estimated  value  of  $89.3  billion  in 
1999
7.  During  the  period  1995-99  the 
North American beer market exhibited a 
positive  compound  annual  growth  rate 
(CAGR)  of  3.5  %,  compared  to  a 
negative  -2.5%  for  the  Western 
European  region,  and  a  negative  -
3.06%  for  the  Asian-Pacific  region.    A 
comparison  of  the  three  countries  that 
compose  the  North  American  market 
shows  acute  differences  in  overall 
market  size,  growth  and  composition 
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7 See, Beverage industry, June 2001 
(See Figure 4). The US beer market is 
the  largest  market  with  an  estimated 
value of $55.9 billion for the year 2002, 
followed by the Mexican market whose 
value is estimated at $ 12.8 billion, and 
in  third  place  is  the  Canadian  market 
with  a  value  of  $7.5  billion.    The  US 
beer  market  has  stagnated  in  growth 
exhibiting  a  CAGR  of  only  1%  for  the 
period  1997-2002,  compared  to 
Canada’s  2.86%  and  Mexico’s  10.5%. 
The  Mexican  beer  industry  is  very 
concentrated.  The  top  two  players, 
Modelo  and  Femsa,  accounted  for  a 
combined market share of 98%. In the 
US  Anheuser  Busch  and  SAB-Miller 
account  for  67.8%,  and  in  Canada 
Lebatt’s and Molson account for 67.6% 
of the market.  
Some  of  the major  players  in  the 
North  American  market  are  owned  by 
larger  breweries  in  other  countries. 
Mexico’s  Femsa  &  Canada’s  Lebatt’s 
are  both  partially  owned  by 
InterBrew/Ambev. Miller was purchased 
from  Phillip  Morris  by  South  African 
Breweries  in  2002.  Anheuser  Busch 
bought an 18% stake in Mexico’s Grupo 
Modelo  in  1993,  and  gradually 
increased its holding to 50% in 1998. 
According  to  the  Beer  Institute’s 
Beer serves America; the U.S. brewing 
industry  includes  approximately  1,800 
breweries  and  importers,  2,200 
wholesalers,  and  560,000  retailers. 
Approximately  42,500  Americans  work 
for the nation’s breweries alone, taking 
home $2.6 billion a year in salaries and 
wages.  The  US  ranks  number  one  in 
worldwide  domestic  beer  production, 
with an estimated 186.2 million barrels 
per year in 2002
8 . During the past ten 
years, imports have more than doubled 
their  market  share  of  the  US  market, 
accounting for 11% of retail beer sales 
in  2002
9(See  Figure  5).  US  brewers 
exported  around  2.42%  of  their  total 
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production  volume  in  2002,  slightly  up 
from 2.3% in 2001
10.  
 
Methodology 
In  order  to  assess  the  impact  of 
NAFTA on US beer trade flows, we will 
analyze annual trade data for the period 
1992-2001. The data was compiled by 
the  Foreign  Agricultural  Service,  with 
data from the department of Commerce 
and  the  US  International  Trade 
Commission.  It  is  based  on  US 
import/export receipts and it reflects the 
dollar value of beer trade in thousands 
of  dollars.  We  will  provide  separate 
analysis  for  the  export  data  and  the 
import data. The data will be submitted 
to three different methods of analysis; a) 
comparison  of  absolute  level  of  trade 
between intra NAFTA countries and the 
rest of the world to the US, b) “shift and 
share”  analysis,  and  c)  gravity 
equations. 
  a) Comparison of absolute level 
of trade: The focus of this method is to 
find any evidence that would indicate a 
decrease  in  the  level  of  trade,  or  no 
change at all, with third party countries 
versus an increase in the level of trade 
between intra-NAFTA countries. To the 
extent that the level of trade flows with 
the rest of the world suffered, and that 
trade  with  NAFTA  partners  flourished, 
one  could  assume  that  the  agreement 
had  a  substantial  effect  on  the 
composition of the level of beer trade in 
the  US.  Although  as  Krueger  (1999) 
points  out,  one  could  expect  that  in  a 
dynamic  setting,  such  as  the  growing 
world economy, any shifts in supply and 
demand  would  result  in  a  change  in 
shares  rather  than  an  absolute  level 
change.  Nonetheless  this  method’s 
results  are  worth  taking  into 
consideration. 
  b)  Shift  and  share  analysis:  
This  method  assesses  the  impact  that 
NAFTA  may  have  had  on  the 
percentage  composition  of  trade 
between  third  party  countries  and 
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NAFTA  members.  The  data  are 
separated  into  two  categories  each  in 
percentage  terms  of  total  trade.  This 
method  compares  the  shares  of  trade 
devoted to Mexico and Canada versus 
the rest of the world during each year. 
To the extent that the shares devoted to 
intra-NAFTA trade increased after 1994, 
at the expense of the rest of the world, 
one  could  assume  that  the  agreement 
had  a  significant  impact  on  the 
interaction between the US’s supply and 
demand for beer. 
  c)  Gravity  equations:  This 
method  approaches  the  problem 
through the use of mathematical models 
very similar to those employed by Gould 
(1998). The models attempt to “control” 
for other determinants of trade, so that a 
ceteris-paribus  effect  of  NAFTA  on 
trade can be discerned. This approach 
better addresses some of the problems 
described  in  section  II.  Through  this 
method  one  can  attempt  to  control  for 
problems 2, 5 and 6. The problem of the 
gradual phase out of tariffs, problem 2, 
will  be  addressed  by  including  the 
phasing off in the effective tariff rates in 
NAFTA countries. The issue of severe 
exchange  rate  fluctuations,  problem  5, 
will  be  addressed  by  including  the 
exchange  rate  for  each  year  and 
country.  The  problem  of  CUSFTA, 
problem  6,  will  be  addressed  by 
assigning the NAFTA dummy variable a 
value  equal  to  one  for  Canada 
beginning  at  the  first  year  of  data 
available  (1992).    We  will  employ  two 
separate  models  for  exports  and 
imports. The data will be analyzed in a 
panel form. The Exports model includes 
data  from  nineteen  different  countries 
over  the  observation  period,  and  the 
Imports  model  includes  data  from 
twenty  four  different  countries.  The 
models are as follows; 
Exports: 
EXP  =  B0  +  B1(DISTi,us)  + 
B2(EXCHit) +  B3(POPit) + B4(GDPit) +  
B5(TFFit)  +    B6  (NAFTA)  +  B7 
(CONTi,us) 
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Imports: 
IMP  =  B0  +  B1(DISTi,us)  + 
B2(EXCHit)  +  B3(GDPUSt)  + 
B4(TFFust)  +  B5  (NAFTA)  +  B6 
(CONTi,us) 
  The  DIST  variable  is  the 
distance between the US and its trading 
partner  country  (i).  The  data  is  in 
kilometers  and  was  obtained  from  the 
CEPII geodesic distances data set. The 
EXCH is the average official exchange 
rate  per  US  dollar  during  the  year  as 
accessed  from  the  World  Bank’s  WDI 
online.  The  POP  variable  is  the  total 
population in the importing country.  The 
GDP  variable  is  the  gross  domestic 
product per capita in purchasing power 
parity  terms  expressed  in  current 
dollars,  as  accessed  from  the  WDI 
online.  The  GDPUS  is  the  gross 
domestic product per capita in the US at 
time  (t).  This  is  also  in  purchasing 
power  parity  terms  and  in  current 
dollars.  The  TFF  is  the  effective  tariff 
rate  on  beer  imports  expressed  in 
percentage  terms.  In  the  case  of 
exports from the US, all of the importing 
countries had a value added tax (VAT). 
Some  countries  had  VATs  as  high  as 
200%.  In  the  case  of  imports;  the  US 
imposes  a  flat  dollar  rate  on  volume 
regardless of value. In order to calculate 
the effective tariff rate on US imports we 
divided  the  dollar  value  of  imports  by 
the volume of imports, using data from 
1996  to  2001,  and  obtained  the  price 
per liter. Then we divided the dollar tariff 
rate by the price per liter to obtain the 
effective  tariff  rate.  Most  of  the 
countries’  dollar  per  liter  remained 
constant  with  only  minor  fluctuations 
during the observation period, therefore 
the  effective  tariff  rate  was  assumed 
constant  in  the  period  1992  to  1995 
unless  there  was  some  change  in  US 
government policies. It is worthy to note 
that  the  effective  tariff  rate  on  US 
imports is very low. The range was from 
0%  to  4%.  The  NAFTA  variable  is  a 
dummy variable with a value of one for 
Canada starting in 1992, and a value of 
one  for  Mexico  starting  in  1994.  The 
CONT variable is a dummy variable that 
controls  for  countries  with  a  common 
border. It is equal to one for Mexico and 
Canada during all years. 
 
Results 
This  section  is  divided  into  the 
corresponding  results  for  imports  and 
exports. Each of those two sections is 
subdivided  into  the  three  different 
methods of analysis. The results are as 
follows: 
Exports originating from the US 
The  first  two  methods  of  analysis 
are of graphical nature. All of the graphs 
referred to in this section can be found 
in Figure 6. 
Graph  I  shows  the  indexed  value 
of  US  exports  to  the  top  five  country 
destinations.  The  data  is  indexed  so 
that 1992 trade volume is given a value 
of  100  for  all  countries.  As  the  graph 
clearly shows, Japan’s indexed value of 
trade decreased from a peak of 100 in 
1992, to end with a value of 30.4 in the 
year  2001.  During  this  period  Japan 
passed from being the largest importer 
of US beer in 1992 to become the third 
largest  in  2000.  Both  NAFTA  trading 
partners  experienced  an  increase  in 
their indexed level of trade with the US. 
Canada  maintained  its  number  two 
spot,  and  ended  up  with  an  indexed 
value of 166.8 in 2001. Mexico became 
the most important importer of US beer, 
up from third position in 1992. Mexico’s 
indexed value peaked in 2001, to reach 
a level of 457.4. 
a) Comparison of absolute level of 
trade: Graph II shows the indexed level 
value of NAFTA trade compared to that 
of  US  beer  exports  as  a  whole 
(including Mex & Can). US beer exports 
began declining after peaking at 160.7 
in  1997,  and  ended  the  observation 
period at an indexed value of 98.8. Both 
NAFTA countries ended the observation 
period higher as mentioned in graph I. 
Graph  III  plots  the  percentage 
change  over  a  year  earlier  for  NAFTA 
partners,  exports,  and  the  rest  of  the 
world  (ROW).  The  latter  value  is  the   45
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total  volume  of  trade  minus  that  of 
NAFTA partners. As the table explains 
Canada  has  had  somewhat  of  a 
continuous  upwards  trend  since  1993. 
Mexico  had  some  decrease  in  its  US 
imports after 1994, possibly due to the 
peso crisis, but had a steady upwards 
trend after 1997. As one can clearly see 
the continuous decline of exports to the 
ROW countries,  was much larger than 
the decline of exports as a whole. In fact 
exports  as  a  whole  reported  a  gain  of 
13.1% in 2001, compared to a decline 
of (3.1%) in exports to ROW countries. 
This  is  primarily  due  to  the  weight  of 
Mexico’s 94.7 % increase for that year. 
After this first line of analysis one 
can  conclude  the  following;  the  total 
level of US exports exhibited a period of 
growth  until  1997,  and  then  began  its 
continuous  decline  to  end  the 
observation period at a lower level than 
it  began.  The  decline  in  total  exports 
after  1997  is  much  smaller  than  the 
decline  of  total  ROW  exports.  This  is 
primarily  due  to  the  fact  that  both 
Canada  and  Mexico  exhibited 
tremendous  growth  in  its  US  imports, 
and adding their relative importance in 
overall trade slowed the decline of total 
exports. 
 It is hard to determine whether or 
not NAFTA had any role in the increase 
of US exports to Mexico, since exports 
already exhibited a continuous upwards 
trend previous to 1994. That growth rate 
turned  into  a  decline  of  US  exports  to 
Mexico after 1994, possible due to the 
peso  crisis.  It  is  impossible  to  analyze 
for  sure  if  this  growth  rate  would’ve 
continued  had  there  not  been  such  a 
huge  depreciation  of  the  peso,  or 
whether the anticipation of NAFTA had 
anything to do with this early trend. One 
thing  is  for  certain,  both  the  level  and 
percentage increases after 1997 where 
much  higher  than  the  previous  growth 
trend. This could lead to the conclusion 
that  the  peso  crisis  might  have 
underscored the effect of NAFTA in its 
first two years. 
US exports to Canada exhibited a 
constant growth rate after 1994, except 
for  one  year.  Although  exports  to 
Canada exhibited an impressive 53.4 % 
increase  in  1994,  this  result  might  be 
misleading due to the decline of 41.8% 
the year before (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 
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b) Shift and share analysis: Graph 
IV  plots  the  export  shares  devoted  to 
NAFTA partners and to ROW countries. 
All  three  shares  add  up  to  100%.  As 
one can clearly see the share of exports 
devoted  to  ROW  countries  began  to 
decline  after  1996. We  can  appreciate 
that after 1996 both the share of exports 
devoted to Canada  and  Mexico began 
to  rise,  at  the  expense  of  ROW 
countries. One can again see a decline 
in US exports to Mexico, this time as a 
share  of  total  exports,  from  1993  to 
1996.  This  again  raises  the  question 
whether  the  peso  crisis  might  have 
taken away importance as to the impact 
of NAFTA on US exports to Mexico 
c) Gravity equations: 
The  first  model  attempted  to 
control  for  distance,  exchange  rates, 
population, GDP per capita, tariff rates 
and  included  time  dummies  that 
captured any other time specific events. 
The time dummy for the year 1992 was 
excluded due to  perfect colinearity. As 
the  table  clearly  shows;  distance 
between the importing country and the 
US,  the  importing  country’s  exchange 
rate versus the dollar, and the importing 
country’s populations do not appear to 
have  any  statistically  significant  effect 
on US exports to those countries in both 
of the models. GDP per capita and tariff 
rates  were  the  only  two  statistically 
significant factors in predicting US beer 
exports. As expected tariff rates had a 
negative  impact  on  exports  and  GDP 
per  capita  had  a  positive  impact  on 
exports. A one dollar rise in per capita 
GDP would increase the dollar value of 
exports  by  $  54  dollars,  holding 
everything  else  constant.  A  one 
percentage  increase  in  the  tariff  rate 
would lower the dollar value of exports 
by $174,000 dollars, holding everything 
else constant. The NAFTA variable did 
not have a statistically significant result, 
once you controlled for the fact that the 
US has common borders with  Canada 
and  Mexico.  This  result  might  be 
misleading  due  to  the  .94  Pearson 
correlation  index  between  the  NAFTA 
variable and the CONT variable. 
 
Imports into the US 
The  first  two  methods  of  analysis 
are of graphical nature. All of the graphs 
referred to in this section can be found 
in Figure 7. 
Graph V plots the indexed level of 
imports  into  the  US  from  the  top  five 
import destinations. As the graph clearly 
shows,  all  five  countries  exhibited 
growth  in  their  level  of  imports  during 
the  observation  period.  Mexico 
exhibited the largest level gain out of all 
the  countries,  ending  the  observation 
period  with  an  index  of  595.  Mexico 
surpassed  the  Netherlands  in  1999  to 
become the largest exporter of beer to 
the US. Canada maintained its position 
as the US’s third largest source of beer 
imports.  In  2001,  Mexico  and  the 
Netherlands accounted for a combined 
share of 71% of US beer imports. This 
number is up from the 55% share that 
both countries enjoyed in 1992. 
a) Comparison of absolute level of 
trade:  
Graph VI shows the indexed level 
value of NAFTA trade compared to that 
of  US  beer  imports  as  a  whole 
(including  Mexico  &  Canada).  Imports 
as a  whole  exhibited constant  indexed 
level  growth,  resulting  in  a  peak  level 
index  of  273  in  the  year  2001.  It  is 
worthy  to  note,  that  Canada’s  indexed 
level  growth  was  much  lower  than  the 
overall  indexed  level  growth  of  beer 
imports.  This  is  contrary  as  to  what 
happened  on  the  exports  side.  As 
already  mentioned,  Mexico’s  indexed 
level  growth  was  double  that  of  the 
indexed level growth of beer imports as 
a  whole.  This  trend  is  similar  to  the 
behavior of US beer exports to Mexico. 
Graph  VII  plots  the  percentage 
change  over  a  year  earlier  for  NAFTA 
partners,  imports  as  a  whole,  and  the 
rest  of  the  world  (ROW).  As  the  table 
shows,  the  only  negative  level 
percentage  changes  are  for  Canadian   47
beer  imports.  NAFTA  might  have 
actually  hurt  Canadian  imports  in  its 
earlier  years.  The  Mexican  data  show 
the opposite result. Mexican exports to 
the  US  rose  at  a  higher  level  and 
percentage  for  the  period  comprised 
between 1995 and 1998, than for both 
the  preceding  and  following  periods. 
This again raises the question as to the 
amount of influence that the 1994 peso 
crisis  might  have  had  on  US-Mexico 
beer  trade.  Another  parallel  can  be 
drawn  with  the  exports  data.  If  one 
looks  at  the  table,  Imports  constantly 
exhibited  a  larger  year  over  year 
percentage  gain  than  ROW  imports. 
This is again primarily due to Mexico’s 
relative  importance  in  the  composition 
of  beer  trade  and  its  constant  level 
growth. 
b) Shift and Share analysis: 
Graph  VIII  shows  the  relative 
share changes in the composition of US 
beer imports as a percentage value for 
Mexico, Canada and ROW. As the table 
indicates; Canadian beer imports seem 
to have suffered a substantial decrease 
in  their  relative  share  of  total  imports 
since  the  implementation  of  NAFTA. 
This decline is even more evident in the 
earlier  years  of  the  agreement  (1995-
97). On the other hand, Mexico seems 
to  have  profited  constantly  throughout 
the observation period. Its share of total 
imports  more  than  doubled  during  the 
whole period. The relative gain is more 
severe  in  the  earlier  years  of  the 
agreement (1995-98), a period in which 
Mexico’s relative share of total imports 
exhibited  a  56.6%  gain.  It  seems  that 
NAFTA may have had a positive effect 
on Mexico’s relative share importance in 
the composition of US beer imports, at 
the  expense  of  ROW  countries  and 
Canada. 
c) Gravity equations: 
The  first  model  attempted  to 
control for distance, exchange rates, US 
GDP per capita, tariff rates and included 
time  dummies  that  captured  any  other 
time  specific  events.  The  time  dummy 
for the year 1992 was excluded due to 
perfect colinearity.  As the table clearly 
shows  distance  does  not  appear  to 
have a statistically significant effect on 
US imports. This is not surprising given 
the  relative  importance  of  some 
Western European countries especially 
the Netherlands, Germany and the UK. 
The  level  of  US  GDP  per  capita, 
exchange rates, and tariff rates do have 
a  statistically  significant  impact  on 
imports.  The  negative  effect  of  the 
exchange  rates  is  due  to  the  fact  that 
the  dependent  variable  is  in  dollar 
value;  therefore  there  is  both  a  value 
and substitution effect. In other words, a 
depreciation  of  foreign  currencies 
results in a lower dollar value of imports 
since now it takes a smaller amount of 
dollars to buy foreign beer. A one unit 
depreciation in foreign currency leads to 
a  decrease  of  $896,000  in  US  beer 
imports,  holding  everything  else 
constant.  The  level  of  US  GDP  per 
capita had a positive effect on the dollar 
value of US beer imports. A one dollar 
increase in US GDP per capita leads to 
an increase of $6,241 in the dollar value 
of imports. The US tariff rates on beer 
have  a  negative  impact  on  US  beer 
imports. According to this model a one 
percentage  point  increase  in  the  US 
tariff rate decreases the dollar value of 
US  beer  imports  by  $76,136,820.  As 
mentioned  before  the  US  imposes  the 
same  dollar  level  on  all  beers 
regardless  of  their  value.  This  tariff 
policy favors premium beers as it results 
in a lower effective tariff rate given their 
higher  price  per  liter.  The  US’  tariff 
policy  and  the  relative  importance  of 
premium  beers  in  the  composition  of 
imports tend to overestimate the actual 
impact of tariff rates in the model. This 
is  due  to  the  fact  that  lower  cost 
producers,  who in turn tend to have  a 
lower  individual  share  of  imports,  face 
slightly  higher  effective  tariff  rates.  
Given this, the model will tend to equate 
low  volume  with  high  tariff  rates,  and 
high volume with low tariff rates. Hence, 
the numerical impact of US tariff rates 
may be overstated in the model. As in   48 
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the case of exports the NAFTA variable 
did  not  have  a  statistically  significant 
result,  once  you  controlled  for  the  fact 
that the US has common borders  with 
Canada  and  Mexico.  Again,  this  result 
might  be  misleading  due  to  the  .94 
Pearson  correlation  index  between  the 
NAFTA variable and the CONT variable 
(Table 2). 
 
Table 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions and 
implications for further research 
Both  Mexico  and  Canada  were 
already  important  sources  in  the  US 
beer trade, prior to NAFTA’s inception. 
During the observation period, Canada 
maintained  its  ranking  as  the  second 
most  important  buyer  of  US  exports, 
and as the third most important source 
of US beer imports. On the other hand 
Mexico’s relative importance in the US 
beer  trade  grew,  placing  it  at  the  top 
spot  for  both  the  import  and  export 
sides.  All  NAFTA  beer  trade  became 
free of duties in 2001. 
US exports as a whole exhibited a 
negative  CAGR  of  -.1266%  during  the 
observation  period,  compared  to 
Canada’s  5.85%  and  Mexico’s  18.4%.  
Exports  peaked  in  1995  and  then 
continued to decline thereafter. US beer 
exports  to  other  countries  face  higher 
value added tariffs than imports into the 
US. In the case of Mexico, the country 
imposed a 20% VAT on all beer imports 
prior  to  1994.  Before  NAFTA,  US 
exports  to  Mexico  already  exhibited  a 
steady  constant  growth  and  then 
suffered a steep decline during the first 
two years of the agreement. This again 
raises the question about how much of 
an impact the 1994 Mexican peso crisis 
had  on  Mexican  beer  trade.  Even 
though Mexico accounted for 26% of all 
US beer exports in 2001, beer imports 
as  a  whole  account  for  a  fraction 
smaller than 2% of the Mexican market. 
On  the  other  hand  Canada  exhibited 
constant  growth  throughout  the 
observation  period,  increasing  both  its 
level and share of US beer exports. 
Overall the quantitative effects that 
NAFTA  had  on  US  beer  exports  still 
remain  in  question.  Both  Mexico  and   49
Canada  already  exhibited  growth  in 
their US exports before the agreement. 
It  is  hard  to  determine  whether  this 
growth rate would have continued or at 
what pace, had the agreement not been 
signed.  In  the  case  of  Mexico  NAFTA 
had  an  unarguable  effect  in  reducing 
non tariff barriers to trade for US beer 
exports. This is especially the case for 
Anheuser Busch due to their acquisition 
of  Grupo  Modelo. With  this  acquisition 
Anheuser Busch ensured not only that 
Grupo  Modelo  would  distribute  their 
brands  in  Mexico,  but  that  Mexico’s 
biggest  brewer  would  not  use  its 
political  clout  to  prevent  US  beer 
exports  from  entering  the  Mexican 
market.  Other  US  companies  like 
SABMiller  still  face  these  political 
hurdles when trying to export beer into 
Mexico.  This  company  has  accused 
Femsa  and  Modelo  on  numerous 
occasions  for  being  responsible  to  the 
long delays that their trucks suffer at the 
US-Mexico  border.  One  SABMiller 
employee  was  quoted  as  saying 
“Exporting beer is fun. Mexico is a fun 
country.  Exporting  beer  into  Mexico  is 
not fun.
11” 
US  beer  imports  as  a  whole 
exhibited  a  positive  CAGR  of  11.7% 
during  the  observation  period, 
compared  to  Canada’s  5.46%  and 
Mexico’s  21.9%.  As  mentioned  before 
US  beer  imports  have  more  than 
doubled  their  share  since  the  early 
nineties, accounting for 11% of all beer 
sales in 2001. The US tariff policies help 
reinforce  the  rise  in  demand  for 
premium  beers  given  that  their  higher 
price  per  liter  reduces  their  effective 
tariff rate. The US also has one of the 
lowest  effective  tariff  rates  on  beer 
outside  of  free  trade  areas.  Mexican 
imports into the US were already rising 
prior  to  NAFTA,  yet  their  growth  rate 
was  more  accentuated  during  the  first 
years of the agreement. This also raises 
the  question  of  the  magnitude  of  the 
                                                 
11 See, Wall Street Journal, Jan 17, 2003  
 
effect that the Mexican peso crisis had 
on  this  country’s  bilateral  trade.  The 
OLS models both predict that exchange 
rates  have  a  statistically  significant 
effect  on  US  beer  exports,  contrary  to 
the case of US exports. In the case of 
Canada the agreement seems to have 
had  an  adverse  effect  especially  in  its 
earlier years. 
Again, the quantitative effects that 
NAFTA  might  have  had  on  US  beer 
imports  still  remain  in  question.  The 
agreement  had  a  subdued  negative 
effect on Canadian imports and seems 
to  have  accentuated  the  previous 
growth  of  Mexican  imports.  Although 
NAFTA did not substantially reduce non 
tariff barriers to trade in the US, other 
than  improve  the  logistics  involved  in 
trading beer, it did have one important 
unquantifiable  effect  on  imports,  which 
is  Anheuser  Busch’s  acquisition  of 
Modelo.  With  the  pending  threat  of 
NAFTA in 1993, Modelo decided to sell 
part  of  their  business  to  Anheuser 
Busch.    The  impact  that  this  alliance 
had  on  Corona’s  sales  into  the  US 
remains  without  question.  The  brand 
grew from an 11% share of imports in 
1990 to roughly accounting for one third 
of total US beer imports in 2001. It was 
in the year 1997 that Corona surpassed 
Heineken  as  the  leading  US  imported 
beer brand.  
This  paper  demonstrates  the 
importance of disaggregating beer trade 
into  brands  rather  than  grouping  beer 
trade by countries. This is especially the 
case for Mexico given the huge success 
of Corona. It is not intuitive to say that 
Mexican imports grew  without knowing 
that  most  of  the  growth  was 
experienced  by  one  brand  only.  This 
work  also  sheds  light  into  the 
importance  of  analyzing  the  possible 
impacts  that  foreign  direct  investment 
and strategic alliances between brewers 
might  have  on  beer  trade.  These 
alliances not only result in the sharing of 
capital,  knowledge  and  distribution 
resources, but as a way of reducing non 
tariff barriers to trade in some countries.   50 
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This work also raises the public policy 
issue  as  to  why  the  US  is  the  only 
country that charges a flat dollar rate on 
volume, regardless of value. Given the 
relatively  low  bilateral  tariffs  between 
NAFTA  countries  and  their  prior 
importance in US beer trade flows, the 
conclusion  that  arises  is  that  any 
substantial  effect  that  the  agreement 
might have had would surely be of an 
unquantifiable nature. 
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World's biggest Brewers, by Volume (2002)  
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8.88%
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Figure 5 
United States  Mexico  Canada 
Market size  (   Bill)  $55.90  $12.80  $7.50 
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Coors                  (11%)  Anheuser Busch  (14.7%) 
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Graph V
Top five import destinations
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